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Abstract: 
 In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the popular press has noted a 
rebound in casino revenues in some states, and some expect casino revenues to grow and 
increase again along with any economic recovery.  However, before the recent recession, there 
were trends indicating stagnation or a peak of casino revenues in most states, and as the last 
recession has indicated, casino revenues were not “recession-proof” as most had thought 
previously.  In fact, casino revenues in most states saw big declines.  In this paper, we show that 
the casino revenues have stagnated or declined partially due to a saturation point being reached 
with regard to casino gaming in many areas of the United States.  The growth rate of casino 
revenues as well as the tax receipts for the state governments from casinos follows an ‘S’ curve 
which is similar to a product life cycle curve. The introduction of more gambling venues as well 
as putting in slot machines at race tracks may give a temporary boost to state gambling tax 
receipts, but longer run trends indicate that the years of casinos showing large gains in revenues 
may be over unless casino operations continue to re-invent themselves.  
 
JEL Codes: H7, J4, R1  
Keywords: Casinos, Tax revenue, Life Cycle Theory, Regional Development. 
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Introduction: 
 Beginning in the late 1970s, more than twenty-four state governments in the US have 
enacted laws permitting legalized casino gambling, racinos (a combination of a casino and race 
track), state lotteries, electronic gaming devices at bars and entertainment centers, and tribal 
casinos.  Some have written that the increased presence of gambling in different parts of the US 
comes as a result of more tolerant attitudes toward gambling, the need for states to raise more tax 
revenues, and local economic development goals and objectives (Madhusudhan 1996, Eadington 
1999, Garrett 2003, and Landers 2009).   This expansion of gambling occurred in spite of fears 
about increased crime rates and personal bankruptcies (Friedman, Hakim, and Weinblatt 1989, 
Hsu 2000) and the cannibalization by casinos of other local hospitality and entertainment 
operators so that the net impact of a casino could be less than anticipated (Guell 2010).   
The casino industry has experienced an explosive growth rate from the late 90’s through 
mid-2000’s. As a result, tax receipts from gambling became an important source of revenue for 
the state and local governments.
2
 Guell (2010) wrote that casinos generate around $5 billion 
annually in tax receipts for state and local (S-L hereafter) jurisdictions on approximately $30 
billion in casino revenues. Whether the casino industry can sustain this explosive growth and 
higher revenue in the long run is an issue that needs to be examined.  The data on gambling 
revenue indicate that the trend in casino revenues over the last 20 years has followed an S-curve 
pattern, which is often observed when goods and services are offered in a market place. The 
trend or pattern is referred as a “product life cycle” with four stages such as – introductory, 
growth, maturity and declining stages.  Therefore the focus of this paper is to determine whether 
                                                 
2 The gaming commission reports used in the analyses for this paper show that the bulk of the revenues go to the 
state governments.  The local governments usually receive far less amounts.  Also, Dadayan and Ward (2011) note 
that at most gambling tax revenues from lotteries, casinos, race tracks, etc. account for only 2% of tax revenue.   
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gambling revenues has been peaking, saturating (maturing) or declining on a per establishment 
basis, and, to explain the reasons for the stagnating revenues to the state government using long 
term data for eleven states
3
.  We define casino saturation as too many casinos per state and metro 
region, which in turn results in declining per establishment and overall per state casino adjusted 
tax revenues and S-L government tax receipts.   
Literature review: 
 As states have authorized or considered casinos, many authors have evaluated them from 
different perspectives ranging from social/economic impacts to revenue to S-L governments. 
Guell (2010) noted that casinos have only a slight impact on employment in communities with 
high unemployment prior to the casino opening, whereas Garrett (2003) found that casinos have 
their biggest employment impacts in rural areas.  Some have written that casino costs outweigh 
benefits (Grinols and Mustard 2001) whereas others note inconclusive results in doing an 
evaluation (Eadington 1999).  Walker and Jackson (2007) wrote an article where it was shown 
that casinos have no real long term economic development impacts on states and localities.  
Wenz (2007 and 2008a) found that casinos raise nearby home values and have their 
greatest impacts in low population density areas and that economic activity was slightly greater 
in areas with Native American casinos than those with non-Native American casinos, although in 
general, casinos had very little impact on other quality of life variables.  He also failed to find 
that a proliferation of casinos along the Mississippi River was due to states behaving strategically 
and trying an import substitution strategy (Wenz 2008b).  On the other hand, Navin and Sullivan 
                                                 
3
 According to Dadayan and Ward (2011) currently 15 states in the US have legalized corporate commercial casinos.  
Among them Kansas, Maryland, Pennsylvania and West Virginia legalized gambling in 2007, 2008, 2004 and 2009 
respectively. As our focus is to analyze the trend in tax revenues to state government using long run time series data, 
we exclude these states from our study as they are relatively new.  Therefore, we examine 11 states which have 
gambling records going back to the early to mid-1990s.  Tribal casinos have been around for much longer, yet have 
not played much if any role in the economic development or tax enhancement efforts of state governments over the 
years. Recently, these establishments have not been making as much money as in the past (Melia 2013).     
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(2007) showed Illinois and Missouri casinos to be strong competitors in the St. Louis, Missouri-
Illinois Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) after the introduction of Missouri casinos in the 
mid-1990s to compete against Illinois casinos established on the Illinois side of the Mississippi 
River earlier in the decade.  The competition forced payouts to patrons up, although because of 
this, tax receipts to state governments went down.   
In trying to explain how efficient casinos in five states were in generating gross revenues 
and S-L tax revenues given inputs such as gaming space, number of employees, etc., Lambert, 
Srinivasan, Dufrene, and Min (2010) found that those casinos which scored highest in a data 
envelopment analysis are those that were located in the urban core, central county of a MSA.  
Whether a casino bordered another state (and thereby can “export” its gambling) was not shown 
to be a factor in casino efficiency scores, although racinos scored among the best.       
After over a decade of casino operations in Indiana, Landers (2009) showed that 
attendance and revenues at Indiana casinos began to peak around 2003 and 2004 after dramatic 
growth from 1996 (when casinos were first permitted to operate) to 2002, and this was also the 
trend in most other states that had casino gaming in the 1990s (Landers 2009, Dadayan and Ward 
2011).  Landers  also noted the negative impact that a tribal casino which opened in southwestern 
Michigan in 2007 had on a neighboring Michigan City, Indiana casino as well as how the 
opening of a French Lick, Indiana casino took business away from casinos in Evansville, Indiana 
and Elizabeth, Indiana, which is in the Louisville, Kentucky-Indiana MSA.   Landers concluded 
that the possibility of legalized gaming in neighboring Kentucky and Ohio could further limit the 
growth potential of Indiana casinos.  In November 2009, Ohio voters approved legalized gaming 
while Kentucky has continued to debate its merits (Gerth 2010).   
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 There are a few studies in the literature that have explained the trend in the gambling 
revenues using a product life cycle approach. According to the product life cycle theory 
(Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984), products and services pass through distinct stages through a life 
cycle. In the introductory stage a product’s “life” takes off gradually, and as markets start to 
accept the product, it shows increasing sales (sometimes at an increasing rate) one time period 
after another, which marks the growth stage. As time goes by, the rate of sales eventually peaks 
and slows down as more consumers adopt and use the product until most of the market is 
covered or saturated, which is referred to as a maturity state. Eventually, if a product is not 
rejuvenated or repackaged or introduced to a new market segment, and if new competing and 
alternative products are introduced, a product’s sales can go into decline and could eventually 
become extinct (Kotler and Keller, 2012).   
Stansfield (1978) studied the decline of tourism in Atlantic City and identified a four 
stage resort cycle similar to the product life cycle. The resorts had early success and exclusivity 
followed by a broad appeal to lower income groups, and then abandonment by early patrons, 
slow decline, and finally a decay in their popularity.   Hofer (1975) suggested that major changes 
in business strategy are usually required during three stages of the life cycle: introduction, 
maturity, and decline.  During late 1960’s when the resorts decayed, Atlantic City sought to 
reinvent itself by legalizing gambling. 
Markusen (1985) and Blair (1995, page 118) write that regional economic success is, to 
one degree or another, based upon the profitability of the major industries/employers within a 
region, and this in turn depends upon at which stage these industries find their products in the 
product life cycle.  A disproportionate number of industries/employers in an area which have 
products in the later stages of the product life cycle will find their profits peaking, which in turn 
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means that regional economic performance may also be at a peak unless new and growing 
industries are developed and nurtured (e.g., Detroit with automobiles, Pittsburgh and Gary, 
Indiana with steel-making).  If not, and if the products go into the decline stage of the product 
life cycle, regional economic fortunes begin to decline as well (e.g., Flint Michigan, Cleveland, 
Ohio, etc.).  Therefore, states and localities have to continually keep attracting, developing, 
and/or nurturing new industries in order to keep job and tax revenues growth growing.   
Vasche (1985) used a multiple regression analysis to estimate the determinants of per-
capita lottery sales and found that alternative forms of legal wagering had a negative impact on 
lottery sales. Deboor (1986), used an exponential growth model to report that since 1971 lottery 
sales had grown rapidly due to new adoption and the spread of participation in the lottery states. 
He projected that sales of lottery would level off in the future. Mikesell and Zorn (1987) 
validated earlier works of Vasche and DeBoer on lottery sales and reported that lottery sales 
begin to decline after approximately 11 years due to alternative wagering and competition 
(border effects) from surrounding states  selling lotteries. 
Moss et.al., (2003) used a Butler S product life cycle to explain gaming revenue in 
Mississippi. From their empirical analysis, they report that the casino industry in Mississippi 
followed a Butler’s S-shaped product life cycle curve, and  that revenues are near the end of the 
mature stage (Stage 5) or possibly even at the onset of decline (stage 6). They conclude that 
increased competition among casinos within the state and from other states has resulted in a 
reduction in the gamblers/customer base and overall growth in the industry during the later 
period.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, the methods used to assess 
trends in casino gambling revenues per establishment are discussed followed by the results and a 
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discussion of the findings.  In the last section, we discuss any limitations of the research and 
policy recommendations with regard to S-L casino gambling for both states that currently have 
casinos as well as those considering the legalization of casino gambling.  
Model:  
 The data are analyzed using a simple tabular/graphical analysis and regression analysis 
using an exponential growth forecasting model. For the tabular analysis (see Tables 1 and 2) we 
use data for eleven states from 2000 to 2010 collected from annual reports for the gaming 
industry from each state.  The 11 states were chosen because they form a panel of states that 
show casino revenues rising and then declining in the last decade. The growth rate of tax revenue 
from casinos is computed on an annual basis to determine the trend.   
The tax receipts (nominal) for  S-L governments from casinos may be explained using the 
number of casinos in a state, rate of unemployment,  real state product, tax rates
4
, number of slot 
machines, number of tables, dummy variable for recessionary years, and the time (in years) that 
casinos have been in place. The growth of tax receipts for S-L governments follows an 
exponential growth during initial years and then it plateaus during later years. To explain this 
growth, our growth function takes an exponential form 
U = ae
okt
 
where, U is the tax receipts to state governments, t is the time trend, k is number of 
establishments. This growth function is extended to include other variables and converted to 
semi-logarithmic specification and the regression is conducted in the following manner: 
                                                 
4
 This was used in a subset of models because not all of the states disclosed their state and local tax rates or it was 
difficult to determine their tax rates for casinos.  Yet four of the larger states (Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa) 
disclosed this information, and so this was variable was used with the others to gauge the effects of tax rates on tax 
revenue collected.      
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log (tax receipts) = a + b1(establishments) + b2 ( unemployment rate) + b3 log(per capita 
real GDP) + b4 log tax rates +b5 log slot machines + b6 log tables + b7 ( recession 
dummy) + b8 (year).  
 
where, tax receipts are total tax receipts to the S-L governments from casinos, number of 
establishments in a given year (both in linear and quadratic forms), rate of unemployment in a 
state in time t, per-capita  real state  production in time t, and year (in linear, quadratic and cubic 
forms) is a time trend (1991 = 0….., 2010 = 19).  Unemployment rate and per-capita real state 
product are used to measure the economic well-being of states. These variables indirectly 
measure the discretionary spending of people. The number of slots and tables are used to see if 
the level of gambling opportunities impacts tax receipts, while the tax rates are used to determine 
the impact on tax S-L government tax receipts.  The dummy recessionary variable is used to 
control for the effects of any economic downturns in the economy and their possible impacts on 
revenues. For four of the larger of the eleven states (Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa), 
average tax rates were calculated from state reports and used to see if higher rates yield higher 
revenues.
5
  The estimated coefficients are elasticities of tax receipts with respect to real state 
product, number of slots and tables, and tax rates. The estimated coefficient of the 
unemployment rate (which is not in log form) is interpreted as the percentage change in the tax 
receipts when the percentage of unemployment rate increases by one percentage point, ceteris 
paribus (Wooldridge, 2002). Time trend is the growth rate of nominal tax receipts for S-L 
governments every year.  
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here) 
Data: 
                                                 
5
 Because of the possible endogeneity between tax revenues and tax rates, 2SLS regression was performed using 
winnings to patrons (WTP) or winning per admissions as an instrumental variable.  WTP was chosen as an 
instrumental variable since greater payments to patrons result in less tax revenues and adjusted gross revenues to 
casinos since greater winnings paid out leave less money for taxes and casino earnings. (Navin and Sullivan 2007).     
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 The annual data for the 11 states for the last 20 years (1991-2010) were collected from 
annual reports for the gaming industry from various states. In 1991, 7 states in the US had 
granted licenses for commercial casino operations and subsequently Missouri started granting 
licenses in 1994, Indiana in 1996, and Michigan in 1997 (see Table 1 for number of casinos). 
The data collected at the state level includes tax revenue for the S-L government (tax receipts) 
from the casinos, adjusted gross revenues, number of establishments (we include only the 
number of casinos operating in a state), unemployment rates, per-capita gross domestic product 
(nominal) and number of casinos surrounding a particular state to analyze the border effect.  
Only in a handful of states were casinos allowed to operate during the 1990’s. By 1998, all 
eleven states in our study had fully operational casinos. Therefore we have an unbalanced panel 
data for the analysis with 202 observations for 20 years. Additionally, for a subset of 7 states 
(Colorado, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri and South Dakota) we collect annual 
number of tables and slots in casinos from 1995 through 2010. Finally, among the seven states, 
we collect annual average tax rates for four states (Colorado, Indiana, Illinois and Iowa), for the 
same time period.  More states would have been used, but the data for tables, slots, and tax rates 
were not available for all states.    
Results and Discussion:  
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here) 
Data for eleven states (see Table 2 for a list) which have had casinos (whether riverboat 
or regular casinos) as well as racinos for the period of 1991 to 2010 are examined as a cohort to 
see whether casino gross revenues and casino revenue shares paid to the states and local 
governments, which grew rapidly during the 1990s, had peaked and/or even declined during the 
following decade similar to what was noted above about Indiana.  Of special interest is whether 
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on a per establishment basis revenues have peaked or declined, which would possibly indicate 
that a saturation point has been reached in casino revenue growth due to more and more 
establishments operating over time.    
In looking at Table 2, which like the other tables in this paper uses fiscal year (July 1 to 
June 30) numbers, the first few years of the decade showed on a per establishment basis a good 
average growth rate of almost 12.8, yet afterwards, growth slowed from the middle of the decade 
up to the onset of the Great Recession (around a  3-4 percent growth rate), and then during and 
after the recession, growth was at its lowest, with the only good year being 2009-10.  At a more 
aggregate level, Figure 1 shows overall casino revenues for most states either flat-lining or 
declining by the middle of the decade before the recession started
6
, and Figure 2 illustrates the 
volatility in revenue growth changes from year to year on a per establishment basis. The trend in 
the casino revenues during these 10 years or so somewhat resembles the latter stages of Butler’s 
S-curve pattern or a product life cycle.  Meanwhile, the total monthly revenues for five states 
which had data going back to the 1990s (excluding Nevada)—Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, 
Mississippi and Missouri—form an S-shaped curve similar to a product life cycle curve (see 
Figure 3).
7
   
(Insert Table 3, Figures 3 and 4 around here) 
Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4 show most tax revenues to state and local governments from 
casino operations also peaking or declining around the middle of the 2000-2010 time period with 
revenue growth rates doing better earlier in the decade than later.  The stagnating or declining 
revenues occur even as some states like Indiana and Louisiana examined in this paper have 
                                                 
6
 Mississippi casinos in the Biloxi-Gulfport metro area suffered a setback with Hurricane Katrina, which explains a 
sudden decrease for this state in the middle of the decade, although gambling revenues have struggled to get past 
their 2004 peak.   
7
 Not all states disclose or publish data on a monthly basis.   
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begun to allow gambling at race tracks during the decade (Iowa has had racinos since the 1990s). 
In order to keep revenues from stagnating or falling, states which previously only had riverboat 
gaming changed their laws to allow land based gaming in order to increase attendance and 
revenues (e.g., Illinois and Indiana) or permitted gambling at race tracks (e.g., Indiana and 
Louisiana among others). This paper puts forth that casino revenues are now probably at the 
maturity stage of the product life cycle and offers models to support this contention.   
(Insert Table 4 around here) 
The growth function in semi-logarithmic specification for the panel data (across states 
over time [1991 – 2010]8) was estimated using a fixed effects model with state fixed effects9 and 
is presented in Table 4. Results in the first column indicate that establishment and establishment 
squared are not statistically significant. In the second and third columns, establishment squared is 
statistically significant (α < 0.10) and has a negative coefficient.  Therefore there is a little 
evidence that revenues may increase, peak, and then decline over time.   Per-capita real state 
domestic product has a positive and significant relationship with tax receipts in the first model 
(column 1) but is not statistically significant in the others. The recession dummy is not 
significant in all three specifications, although the unemployment rate variable works in all three 
models at an alpha value of below 10% and has a negative coefficient.  Therefore, cyclical 
effects matter with casino tax revenues. But the most interesting results in these specifications 
are the estimated coefficients on the year variables. In the first specification, the year variable is 
positive and significant, illustrating that the tax revenues for S-L governments are growing every 
year for all states in the model. To determine whether the tax revenue for states has stagnated or 
                                                 
8
 We also analyzed a balanced panel data [1998 – 2010] for all eleven states, and these results are reported in Table- 
1 in the Appendix. The results are statistically similar to the results obtained from an unbalanced panel. 
9
 Hausman tests showed that fixed effects results are preferred to random effects or pooled OLS models, so those are 
shown in this paper.  Hausman test and results from random effect models can be sent upon request.   
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declined, a quadratic and cubic terms are introduced in the next two specifications. In the second 
specification, the quadratic term (year) is significant and negative, indicating that the growth rate 
of tax receipts to state and local governments has started to decline in the later years and follows 
a ‘S shaped” trend or pattern like the latter stages of a product life cycle10. The third specification 
in which there are quadratic and cubic year terms does not have these variables showing 
statistical significance.  
(Insert Table 5 around here) 
The growth function of tax revenues was estimated by including games – slots and tables 
in the semi-log specification for 7 states
11
 in the state fixed effect model. The results in Table 5 
columns 1 to 3 indicate that adding tables and slots did not have that much of an impact on 
adding more tax revenues.   The recession dummy is not statistically significant in any of the 
models, whereas the state domestic product per capita is only statistically significant in the first 
model (column 1). In these models the unemployment rate is not statistically significant.  The 
other results in Table 5 column (2) and (3) contain quadratic and cubic specifications for the year 
variable. The year variables in quadratic specification (column 2) are significant with a positive 
sign for year and negative sign for the squared term, illustrating a decline in tax revenues for S-L 
governments. In the cubic specification, only the year variable is significant. In models 1 and 3 
(columns 1 and 3), the number of establishments and/or establishments squared were the other 
variables that were statistically significant implying a direct relationship between number of 
casinos in a state and tax revenue.  In the first model, the increase and then decline in S-L 
                                                 
10
 The results were statistically similar when we controlled for number of Native American casinos in this 
specification. Native American casinos had a negative and significant effect on tax receipts to the state governments. 
The payout to patrons from Native American casinos is relatively more than other casinos in the state as they pay an 
average of 10-12 percent of revenue to the state government while commercial casinos pay 19-24 percent of total 
gaming revenue (National Indian Gaming Commission). The results from this specification are presented in 
Appendix - Table 1.  
11
 Colorado, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri and South Dakota 
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revenue is denoted by the statistical significance of the establishment and squared establishment 
terms.   
(Insert Table 6 around here) 
A third specification for tax revenues was estimated by including average tax rate paid by 
the casinos to the S-L governments. This specification was analyzed for a subset of four states
12
. 
The results from all three specifications presented in Table 6 indicate that the tax rates have a 
negative and significant influence on the tax revenue. The third-order polynomial specification in 
column (3) indicates that higher GDP and lower unemployment rates have a significant and 
positive effect on the tax revenues, while the higher tax rates reduces tax revenues to the state 
and local governments. All three year variables (first, second and third order) are significant and 
exhibit an S-curve configuration. These results indicate that growth of tax revenue for S-L 
governments started to decline in later years and follows a pattern similar to a product life cycle. 
During the 1990’s and up to the early part of the last decade, there was high growth in overall 
casino revenues as well as in what was paid in taxes to S-L governments throughout the US 
(with perhaps the exceptions of a downturns due to the 1991 and 2001 recessions).  After the 
2001 recession, the revenue for casinos slowed down or started to experience decline as the 
casinos had to share their customer base with new gaming options (within their borders and with 
neighboring states). To prevent revenues from stagnating or falling, states which previously only 
had riverboat gaming changed their laws to allow land based gaming in order to increase 
attendance and revenues (e.g., Illinois and Indiana) or permitted gambling at race tracks (e.g., 
Indiana and Louisiana among others). These efforts are similar to manufacturers “re-positioning” 
or “re-packaging” a product so as to keep sales from stagnating or to reach broader markets, such 
                                                 
12
 Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri. 
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as the introduction of iPhones and smart phones as improvements over cell phones, or the 
introduction of HDTV to replace traditional television sets. 
(Insert table 7 around here) 
However, it is possible to look at the situation that Illinois faced after Indiana casinos 
opened and look at the St. Louis area casino situation.  Table 7 shows total Illinois casino 
revenues and proceeds to the state from 1991 to 2010.   The introduction of casinos in Missouri 
did not really impact the growth of casino revenues in 1994 negatively although it did slow the 
gains in casino revenues, and with the introduction of casinos in full swing in Indiana in 1996, 
Illinois casino revenues went into a brief decline until 1998, but thereafter showed gains until 
2006.  Beginning in 1999, Illinois allowed “dockside” gambling at its riverboats, which led to a 
big rebound in casino revenues that year, although Indiana followed suit not long afterwards 
(Illinois Gaming Board and Indiana Gaming Commission Annual Reports).  Increasing the 
access to gambling venues has been a recurring theme of the casinos in different states in order 
to try stay competitive with neighboring states and in order to keep revenues growing.     
(Insert Table 8 around here) 
 Further exploring whether the opening of new casinos in surrounding states have an 
impact on tax revenue to S-L governments (or “border effects”), we looked at Illinois again by 
using regression analysis.  Again, Illinois was one of the few states that operated casinos in the 
early 1990s. After that several Midwest states jumped on the bandwagon in granting licenses to 
run casinos – Iowa, Missouri (1994) and Indiana (1995). To analyze this border effect on Illinois, 
we use the annual tax receipts data from 1991 through 2010 for Illinois, and regression equations 
are estimated including number of casinos in Iowa (Iowa had casinos in operation in 1989) in the 
model followed by Missouri and Indiana. The results from these three models are presented in 
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Table 6. In all three specifications, the number of establishments and Illinois real state GDP per-
capita were positive and had a significant influence on tax revenue to Illinois. The magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients for the establishment variable, decreased when Missouri granted 
licenses to open casinos (5.7325 to 5.3590), and it bounced back by 1/11
th
 of a percent (5.4431) 
when Indiana granted licenses to open casinos. In all three regressions the effect of the state 
variable is significant as Illinois did experience a slight dip in the tax revenues after Missouri 
granted licenses to operate casinos and it recovered slightly after Indiana started casinos. The 
estimated coefficient on per-capita GDP declines as more states are included in the regression. 
The tax receipts on Illinois declined by half when Missouri granted license to operate casinos 
and there was a marginal decline when Indiana followed suit in 1995. The tax revenues for 
Illinois rebounded after the introduction of dockside gambling on river boats in 1999. From this 
analysis, we could interpret that decreases in revenues for Illinois are due to the opening of 
casinos in Missouri and Indiana as “border effects.”  We expected that the state variables Iowa, 
Missouri and Indiana would have a negative impact of Illinois’s tax receipt which could possibly 
explain the border effects. Unfortunately, our analysis did not yield those results. A future study 
could be conducted specifically to analyze the border effect by collecting the data at a micro 
(casino) level to estimate the “border effects”, similar to other studies that looked at the St. Louis 
and Chicago areas.   
On the other hand, perhaps the product life cycle approach to explaining the peak in or 
plateauing of casino revenues carries more weight than possible border effects because it may 
not be how many casinos there are in a region but the popularity of casino gaming that is driving 
revenues and attendance.  When casinos were still fairly new in Illinois in the 1990s, the 
competition from Missouri and Illinois was not a real hindrance because the customer base was 
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still growing since casinos in these states were still in their “growth stage” of the product life 
cycle.  If all revenues are stagnating or peaking in most of these states, regardless of whether it 
shares a border with a state that also has casinos, then this paper believes that the stagnation in 
casino revenues may mostly be due to a saturation point being reached among the casino 
customer base within and among the states, which would correspond to the maturity stage of a 
product life cycle.  
Conclusion: 
 In this study, we analyzed the stagnating casino revenues and tax receipts for the eleven 
states using a panel data from 1991 – 2010. Our analyses indicate that tax receipts for state 
governments followed an S-shaped growth pattern with higher growth rate during the decade of 
1990’s followed by a much slower growth rate in the last decade.  The “border effect” on Illinois 
with the number of casinos operating in the neighboring states of Iowa, Missouri and Indiana 
was evident with decreases in tax receipts for Illinois from its existing establishments within the 
state for certain years.  However, in the aggregate and over a longer period of time, any border 
effects did not seem to matter, similar to the findings of Lambert, Srinivasan, Dufrene and Min 
(2010). 
 With revenues apparently stagnating, even during a recovery stage in the current business 
cycle (as of mid-2013), and with more states legalizing or thinking about legalizing gambling, 
the casino industry in the US faces the challenge of how it can once again “re-invent” or re-
position itself to prevent a decline in future revenues or market share.  Another option may be for 
the casinos to ask for assistance from the states in which they operate—the state of Indiana 
recently gave tax breaks to its casinos in order to help them deal with new competition from 
casinos in Ohio (Cook 2013).  Our results indicate that the casino industry in the US may be in 
the maturity stage of the product life cycle.  With online gaming currently being debated in the 
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US, one has to wonder whether physical gambling venues offer as much promise in the future as 
they did in the past.  Unless casino firms are able to offer more and better entertainment or other 
features to draw in consumers, the traditional casino organizational arrangement could be faced 
with declines in sales into the foreseeable future, which would mean less tax revenues to the 
states, unless states are able to somehow tap into any revenues from possible legalized sports 
gambling and/or online gambling, which could also mean opening up investment from foreign 
gambling operations which already have an online presence (Parry 2011) .  Many states want 
possible tax revenues from online gaming, even though it may require state regulation and strict 
monitoring.  In 2011 the New Jersey legislature passed a bill to legalize online gaming within the 
state but Governor Chris Christie vetoed it.  However, that November, New Jersey voters 
approved a referendum legalizing gambling, and although any attempt to implement the law  was 
thought to receive a challenge by the federal government (Shafer 2011), those fears have now 
passed, and New Jersey and Delaware are expected to offer online gaming within their borders 
before the end of 2013 (Parry 2013)
13
 .  The news for New Jersey is especially welcomed given 
the closing of four major casinos in Atlantic City in 2014 with one costing $2.4 billion in 
existence for only two years (Chappell 2014). A major concern with online gambling is how to 
minimize illegal gambling and interstate gambling (within state online gaming is legal), which 
may necessitate the need for cyber café-like gaming parlors.  Of course, any boost in tax 
revenues from online gambling could be offset by the loss of jobs in actual casinos located in the 
states - online gambling can be offered from anywhere and is not as labor intensive as regular 
casino gambling.  This would possibly blunt the economic development efforts of casinos, unless 
                                                 
13
 The federal government now no longer opposes internet gaming as long as it does not include gambling on sports 
events.   
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casino employees could somehow be re-assigned to new duties in online betting parlors if online 
gaming is not permitted from one’s home. 
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Table 1: Number of establishments (Casinos). 
State 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Colorado 40 65 60 58 57 54 49 48 45 43 43 44 45 47 46 43 41 40 39 39 
Illinois 5 9 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Indiana  0 0 0 0 6 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 11 13 12 11 11 
Iowa 0 0 0 0 6 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 11 13 12 11 11 
Louisiana 0 0 0 6 7 11 11 11 23 24 28 20 14 28 27 27 18 19 14 14 
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mississippi 0 0 11 11 11 13 15 15 35 21 36 33 33 31 33 31 34 34 30 30 
Missouri 0 0 4 4 6 7 11 11 11 13 16 12 13 15 14 12 15 16 12 12 
Nevada 192 186 207 207 213 229 235 235 238 321 325 248 263 259 269 264 209 204 256 270 
New Jersey 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 15 12 13 14 17 14 13 15 11 11 
South 
Dakota 79 80 83 87 94 98 91 89 92 95 108 112 113 116 123 138 139 137 138 140 
Source: Dadayan and Ward and state gaming commission reports.   
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Table 2: Casino gross revenues percentage change per establishment per year. 
 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Colorado 7.1 68.1 -8.4 0.5 4.6 12.3 1.3 -15.6 36.1 -29.1 
Illinois 16.6 -5.2 34.8 0.5 4.7 6.9 -22.7 -20.9 -0.6 20.1 
Indiana 9.1 11.9 4.7 -11.1 4.5 3.2 12.9 -12.3 13.8 8.5 
Iowa 11.5 2.9 4.4 10.0 -23.1 5.6 27.1 -8.2 -1.5 29.2 
Louisiana 8.6 -7.2 43.8 42.5 -44.5 11.3 6.8 53.6 -7.7 26.4 
Michigan -9.7 49.0 13.0 5.2 -8.2 -20.4 36.6 -8.3 -1.5 2.9 
Mississippi 69.9 -41.3 8.4 2.9 -5.4 -2.2 19.7 -14.2 -9.4 9.9 
Missouri -9.2 -6.1 43.5 -0.7 -6.8 11.5 18.9 -18.2 -2.4 36.8 
Nevada 1.4 -5.2 1.1 8.1 5.0 10.3 6.4 0.5 -9.9 -3.8 
New Jersey 0.0 -11.8 28.0 -1.1 -3.1 -14.4 14.5 -0.5 -24.8 30.7 
South Dakota 6.0 2.0 29.5 -1.0 16.6 27.7 -5.7 156.0 -16.2 -13.1 
Average 10.12 5.21 18.44 5.07 -5.05 4.70 10.54 10.17 -2.19 10.76 
Average 2000-01 
to 2003-04    12.81       
Average 2004-05 
to 2006-07       3.40    
Average 2007-08 
to 2009-10          6.24 
Source: Dadayan and Ward and state gaming commission reports.   
  
 26 
 
Table 3: State and local tax revenue percentage change per establishment per year. 
 
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Colorado 13.67 66.74 -6.61 1.03 0.61 16.80 2.46 -15.78 31.56 -26.03 
Illinois 18.80 -0.27 72.76 12.34 6.54 -2.18 -23.27 -14.71 -16.85 10.92 
Indiana 5.71 9.15 30.67 -7.78 4.42 3.65 15.65 -19.27 2.40 24.02 
Iowa 10.87 9.57 4.88 15.69 -18.55 -3.56 28.83 -1.08 6.92 14.51 
Louisiana 10.04 -11.56 40.46 43.98 -48.98 16.21 2.75 53.57 -8.59 25.33 
Michigan -5.50 61.93 11.78 8.47 17.33 -20.02 36.66 -18.88 -5.93 23.13 
Mississippi 69.85 -40.41 9.76 0.85 7.22 -23.19 29.29 -5.45 -9.43 4.22 
Missouri -12.03 -9.28 42.43 -1.75 -8.00 10.09 16.80 -18.81 -0.10 38.68 
Nevada 2.76 -3.34 32.93 11.63 7.45 6.74 5.38 19.42 -10.31 -20.78 
New Jersey 0.69 -11.42 24.38 0.55 -4.46 -12.48 20.41 0.46 -25.52 -10.86 
South Dakota -0.17 8.96 25.60 -5.05 14.09 23.55 0.55 167.79 -19.35 -13.98 
Average 10.43 7.28 26.28 7.27 -2.03 1.42 12.32 13.39 -5.02 6.29 
Average 2000-2001 
to 2003-2004 
   
12.81 
      Average 2004-2005 
to 2006-2007 
      
3.90 
   Average 2007-2008 
to 2009-2010 
         
4.88 
Source: Dadayan and Ward and state gaming commission reports.  
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Table 4: Estimated growth/forecasted model for tax receipts (1991-2010) using fixed effect 
(state) in semi-log specification. 
 
Variable Fixed Effect 
(State) (1) 
Fixed Effect 
(State) (2) 
Fixed Effect  
(State) (3) 
Establishment 0.0058 
(0.0059) 
0.0068    
(0.006) 
0.0069    
(0.0058) 
Establishment Squared -.00002 
(.00001) 
-0.00002* 
(0.0000)    
-0.00002* 
(0.00001)       
Unemployment Rate
+
   -0.0352*   
(0.0209) 
-0.0365*  
(0.0201) 
-0.0363*   
(0.0202) 
Real State Product 
Per-capita 
1.3116*** 
(0.3512) 
-0.1776   
(0.5167) 
-0.1446   
(0.5374) 
Recession Dummy -0.0761 
(.0856) 
-0.0038   
(.0847) 
0.0010   
(.0874) 
Year 0.0349*** 
(0.0111) 
0.2134***    
(0.0479) 
0.2255*** 
(0.0712) 
Year Square - -0.0062***   
(0.0016) 
-0.0077   
(0.0069) 
Year Cube - - 0.0001   
(.0002) 
Constant 6.5549 21.1086    20.7438     
    
N 202 202 202 
Note:  Values in parenthesis are standard errors. *Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 
percent; and ***Significant at 1 percent. 
+ 
Unemployment rate is not transformed to logarithmic form. 
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Table 5: Estimated growth/forecasted model for tax receipts (1995-2010) using fixed effect 
(state) in semi-log specification with Slots and Tables in the model. 
 
Variable Fixed Effect 
(State) (1) 
Fixed Effect  
(State) (2) 
Fixed Effect 
(State) (3) 
Establishment 0.0289**   
(0.0144)  
0.0206   
(0.0145) 
0.0232 
(0.0147) 
Establishment Squared -0.0002**   
(0.0001) 
-0.0001    
(0.0001) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
Unemployment Rate
+
 -0.0118 
(0.0318) 
-0.0265   
(0.0317) 
-0.0271 
(0.0318) 
Real State Product 
Per-capita 
1.9626*** 
(0.6692) 
0.0317    
(0.0318) 
0.2063    
(1.1988) 
Tables 0.3053   
(0.2614) 
0.2158   
(0.2583) 
0.1871 
(0.2599) 
Slots -0.1903   
(0.3078) 
-0.1604   
(0.3008) 
-0.1643   
(0.3008) 
Recession Dummy -0.2198    
(0.1421) 
-0.1010   
(0.1484) 
-0.0647 
(-0.0647) 
Year 0.0222   
(0.0230) 
0.2471** 
(0.1019) 
0.3261** 
(0.1285) 
Year Square - -0.0073** 
(0.0032) 
 -0.0187   
(0.0118) 
Year Cube - - 0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Constant  -1.3368    19.9057    16.2214     
    
N 100 100 100 
Note:  Values in parenthesis are standard errors. *Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 
percent; and ***Significant at 1 percent. 
+ 
Unemployment rate is not transformed to logarithmic form. 
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Table 6: Estimated growth/forecasted model for tax receipts (1995-2010) using fixed effect 
(state) in semi-log specification with slots, tables and average tax rate for four states 
 
Variable Fixed Effect 
(State) (1) 
Fixed Effect  
(State) (2) 
Fixed Effect 
(State) (3) 
Establishment
+
 0.2618*** 
(0.0802) 
0.1627* 
(0.0899) 
0.1338 
(0.0853) 
Establishment 
Squared
+
 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0054* 
(0.0032) 
-0.0043 
(0.0031) 
Unemployment Rate
+
 -0.0271 
(0.0205) 
-0.0223 
(0.0198) 
-0.0395** 
(0.0198) 
Real State Product 
Per-capita 
2.6303*** 
(0.4895) 
1.8342*** 
(0.5987) 
1.4516** 
(0.5820) 
Tables -0.1793 
(0.2008) 
0.1139 
(0.2364) 
0.1102 
(0.2225) 
Slot 0.0713 
(0.1493) 
-0.1225 
(0.1622) 
-0.1285 
(0.1527) 
Average Tax -1.0092*** 
(0.3634) 
-0.9254** 
(0.3523) 
-0.9766*** 
(0.3321) 
Recession Dummy 0.0062 
(0.0609) 
-0.0049 
(0.0589) 
-0.0126 
(0.0555) 
Year 0.0334*** 
(0.0083) 
0.1499*** 
(0.0545) 
0.3823*** 
(0.1022) 
Year Squared - -0.0051** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0105) 
Year Cube - - 0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
Constant -5.2763 3.0124 6.9699 
N 60 60 60 
Note:  Values in parenthesis are standard errors. *Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 
percent; and ***Significant at 1 percent. 
+ 
Unemployment rate is not transformed to logarithmic form. 
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Table 7: Aggregated gross revenue for Illinois casinos ($, Million) 
Year 
 
Gross 
Revenue 
Revenue per 
establishment  
1991 14.94 0.04  
1992 226.33 0.64  
1993 605.68 1.55  
1994 979.55 2.43  
1995 1178.31 2.77  
1996 1131.49 2.50  
1997 1054.57 2.34  
1998 1106.75 2.45  
1999 1362.93 2.76  
2000 1658.00 2.93  
2001 1783.96 2.94  
2002 1831.55 3.54  
2003 1709.94 3.22  
2004 1717.99 3.11  
2005 1798.91 3.14  
2006 1923.53 3.38  
2007 1983.39 3.87  
2008 1568.73 3.09  
2009 1428.92 2.66  
2010 1373.42 2.46 
Source: Illinois Gaming Board 
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Table 8: Estimated growth/forecasted model for Illinois’s tax receipts using semi-log 
specification. 
 
Variable Illinois and Iowa 
in the model 
After Missouri 
opened casinos in 
1992 
After Indiana 
opened casinos in 
1995 
Establishment 5.7325*** 
(0.3725) 
5.3590*** 
(0.3506) 
5.4431*** 
(0.3425) 
Unemployment rate
+ 
 
0.0432 
(0.0339) 
0.0225 
(0.0300) 
0.0374 
(0.0307) 
Real State GDP Per-
capita 
3.3575*** 
(0.7623) 
1.8554* 
(0.8839) 
1.7326* 
(0.8548) 
Time -0.0365 
(0.0221) 
-0.0257 
(0.0193) 
-0.0284 
(0.0187) 
Iowa 
 
0.0395 
(0.0274) 
0.0268 
(0.0239) 
0.0289 
(0.0230) 
Missouri 
 
- 0.0633** 
(0.0252) 
0.0378 
(0.0301) 
Indiana - - 0.0383 
(0.0268) 
Constant -27.6791 -11.4614 -10.4609 
Adj-r
2
 0.9647 0.9744 0.9763 
N 20 20 20 
Note: Values in parenthesis are standard errors. * Significant at 10 percent; and ***Significant 
at 1 percent. 
+
Unemployment rate is not transformed to logarithmic form. 
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Figure 1: Casino gross revenues ($, million). 
 Source:  Dadayan and Ward and state gaming commission reports.   
Figure 2: Casino gross revenues percentage change per establishment per year.  
 
Source:  Dadayan and Ward and state gaming commission reports.   
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Figure 3: State and local government tax revenues from casino operations, Fiscal Years, 
2000-2010. 
 
 
Source: State gaming commission reports.   
Figure 4: State and local tax revenue percentage change per establishment per year. 
 
Source: State gaming commission reports.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Estimated growth/forecasted model for tax receipts (2001-2010) with Native 
American casinos using a fixed effect model  
 
Variable Fixed Effect 
(State) 
Fixed Effect 
(State) 
Establishment
+
 
Establishment 
Squared
+
 
0.0084** 
(0.0035) 
0.0070** 
(0.0035) 
-0.00001** 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
Unemployment Rate
+
 -0.0132* 
(0.0068) 
-0.0146** 
(0.0067) 
Real State Product 
Per-capita 
0.9037*** 
(0.2775) 
0.5002 
(0.3329) 
Native American 
Casino 
-0.0380* 
(0.0196) 
-0.0499** 
(0.0200) 
Recession Dummy -0.0089 
(0.0246) 
0.0119 
(0.0261) 
Year 0.0163 
(0.0037) 
0.1369** 
(0.0573) 
Year Square - -0.0037 
(0.0261) 
Constant -21.29 -257.90 
N 110 110 
Note:  Values in parenthesis are standard errors. *Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 
percent; and ***Significant at 1 percent.
 +
 Unemployment rate, Establishment and Native 
American Casino are not transformed to logarithmic form. 
 
